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Laws and the Completeness
of the Fundamental
Martin Glazier
Any explanation of one fact in terms of another will appeal to some sort of
connection between the two. In a causal explanation, the connection might be
a causal mechanism or law. But not all explanations are causal, and neither are all
explanatory connections. For example, in explaining the fact that a given barn
is red in terms of the fact that it is crimson, we might appeal to a noncausal
connection between things being crimson and their being red. Many such con-
nections, like this one, are general rather than particular. I call these general
noncausal explanatory connections laws of metaphysics.1 In this chapter I argue
that some of these laws are to be found in the world at its most fundamental level,
forming a bridge between fundamental reality and everything else. It is only by
admitting fundamental laws, I suggest, that we can do justice to the explanatory
relationship between what is fundamental and what is not. And once these laws
are admitted, we are able to provide a nice resolution of the puzzle of why there
are any nonfundamental facts in the first place.
. The Fundamental and the Derivative
I begin with two distinctions: between causal andmetaphysical explanation on the
one hand, and between fundamental and derivative reality on the other.
First, explanation. Explanation comes in many kinds. One kind is causal: we
explain why our barn is red by saying that it was painted. Here, although the
painting explains the redness, still the latter consists in something other than the
former. But there is another kind of explanation inwhich there is no such ‘distance’.
1 The notion of a law of metaphysics has also been discussed by Sider (, §.) and
Wilsch ().
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This is the kind of explanation at work when we explain why the barn is red by
saying that it is crimson. Here the redness simply consists in, or is nothing over
and above, the crimsonness. Call this second kind of explanation metaphysical
explanation.2
Philosophers have used the term ‘ground’ in speaking of such explanation, but
they have not all used it in the same way. For some, to say that A grounds B
is to say that A metaphysically explains B, while for others ‘A grounds B’ states
an explanatory connection to which this metaphysical explanation will appeal.3
And still others do not explicitly say whether they mean the explanations or the
connections that appear in them. Since this distinction is important here, I will
avoid the term ‘ground’.
I turn now to reality. Reality has many aspects: we speak of economic reality or
physical reality or practical reality. One aspect, which Iwill call fundamental reality,
is the way reality is in itself, with respect to its intrinsic structure. A description
of fundamental reality will perspicuously represent this intrinsic structure; it will
‘carve reality at the joints’. When we say that a given electron has negative charge,
if our best science is on track we describe fundamental reality. Not so when we say
that Obama is president. Although in saying this we do describe reality, we do not
describe fundamental reality.4
Fundamental reality bears a special explanatory relationship to nonfunda-
mental or derivative reality: the way derivative reality is may be metaphysically
explained in terms of the way fundamental reality is. We will express this explana-
tory relationship by saying that fundamental reality is complete.5 I will argue that it
is only by admitting fundamental laws of metaphysics that we are able to see how
the thesis of completeness can be true.
In order to make my argument cleanly, I adopt a framework that is both
widely used and reasonably neutral, on which reality consists of facts. Like
others who adopt this framework I believe that it need not carry any ultimate
commitment to facts, but I will not defend this here.6 Against this background
2 For discussion of metaphysical explanation and of the related notion of ground, see Fine (,
), Schaffer (), Rosen (), and Wilson (). I should note that the term ‘metaphysical
explanation’ is misleading on two counts. First, metaphysical explanations are often given outside
metaphysics: in science, for instance, or in ethics. Second, not all explanations in metaphysics are
metaphysical explanations. For one thing, metaphysicians sometimes give causal explanations. For
another, it may be that there are noncausal explanations in metaphysics that are not metaphysical
explanations: essentialist explanations, for instance.
3 For the former usage, see Litland () and Dasgupta (). For the latter, see Audi (a,
b).
4 For discussion of fundamentality see Fine (), Schaffer (), and Sider ().
5 The term is due to Sider (, ch. ).
6 These others include Fine (), Raven (), and Dasgupta ().
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we can understand the distinction between fundamental and derivative reality as
a distinction between fundamental and derivative facts.7 And we can understand
the claim that fundamental reality is complete as the claim that every derivative
fact may be metaphysically explained in terms of fundamental facts.
Our topic requires us to make quite fine-grained distinctions, since such dis-
tinctions can make a difference to metaphysical explanation. For example, we can
explain why the singleton set {Socrates} exists by saying that Socrates exists, but
not vice versa. This is so even though the explanandum holds just in case the
explanans does. Or again, we can explain why it is not the case that it is not the
case that Obama is president by saying that Obama is president, but not vice versa,
even though the explanandum and explanans logically entail one another. If we
take the explanandum and explanans of a metaphysical explanation to be facts,
our conception of facts must allow these distinctions. We will therefore take facts
to be structured entities built up fromworldly constituents like objects, properties,
quantifiers, connectives, and so on. Facts, then, will be isomorphic to structured
propositions à la Russell.
To see why fundamental laws are required by the thesis of completeness, we
must state it more precisely. In order to do this, we must first say a bit about
explanation and its structure.
. The Structure of Explanation
In one sense of the term, an explanation is a communicative act. But most
philosophers of explanation have understood this communicative sense in terms
of another sense of explanation, onwhich an explanation comprises facts ‘out there
in the world’. We may then take an explanation in the communicative sense to be
an attempt to communicate these facts.8 Our concern herewill bewith explanation
in the factual sense.
What is the structure of such explanation? One simple picture is as follows.
Within an explanation we may distinguish the explanandum, or the fact that is
explained, from the facts that are appealed to in explaining the explanandum.
And this latter group may be further divided. There is first of all the explanans,
or what does the explaining.The explanans may be one fact that on its own fully
explains the explanandum, or it may be a group of facts that jointly explain it. But
the explanans is not all that must be appealed to in explaining the explanandum,
7 Fine () argues that on some antirealist views—expressivism, for instance—there are facts that
are part of neither fundamental nor derivative reality. Set any such facts aside. When I speak of facts,
I mean only those facts which are part of reality.
8 Strevens (, §.).
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for we must also appeal to some fact of explanatory connection between explanans
and explanandum. In a causal explanation, the connection might be a causal
mechanism or law of nature. For example, we might give the following toy
explanation of Socrates’s death:
Explanans: Socrates drank hemlock.
Connection: It is a law of toxicology that anyone who drinks hemlock dies.
Explanandum: Socrates died.
In giving ametaphysical explanation, wewill by contrast appeal to some noncausal
connection. We will consider below what such a connection might be.
The distinction between explanans and connection might be thought spurious.
Isn’t the explanandum explained by both facts taken together rather than only
by the explanans? Although this objection is friendly to my argument, I do not
wish to rest on it. There surely is a sense in which the explanans and connection
jointly explain the explanandum, but I think we can also recognize a difference in
their explanatory roles.The explanans is the distinctive source of the explanatory
‘oomph’; it is what makes the explanandum obtain. It is hard to articulate this
difference, but it would be foolish to ignore it for that reason.
Although the toy explanation above has the form required by Hempel’s
deductive-nomological account of explanation, I do not assume this account.9 I do
not assume that an explanatory connection must be a law or even a general fact,
though I will argue below that some connections are laws. And I do not assume
that the explanandummust be deductively entailed by the explanans together with
the connection.
The connection in a given explanation should be distinguished from the fact
that the explanans explains the explanandum. Although the two facts are closely
related, the explanation appeals only to the former. Indeed, a natural suggestion,
though one I do not assume, is that the former will explain the latter, at least in
part.10 For example, the fact that Socrates’s drinking hemlock explains his death
will itself be explained—partly explained, anyway—by the ‘law of toxicology’.
The classification of a given fact as explanandum, explanans, or connection
is relative to which explanation it is taken to be part of. In our toy explanation,
for example, Socrates’s drinking hemlock serves as explanans: it is what explains
Socrates’s death. But we might give a separate explanation of why Socrates drank
9 Hempel and Oppenheim ().
10 See Bennett (), deRosset (), andDasgupta () for discussion of this issue as it pertains
to metaphysical explanation.
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hemlock, and in this new explanation Socrates’s drinking hemlock will serve as
explanandum.
Call any explanation that satisfies the above simple picture of explanation an
atomic explanation. Although this simple picture has its attractions, it is too simple.
For an explanation can also comprise multiple atomic explanations that have been
‘concatenated’. Wemay, for instance, give the following explanation of the fact that
our barn is coloured in terms of the fact that it is crimson.We first explain why the
barn is coloured by saying that it is red, and we then explain why it is red by saying
that it is crimson. Although a corresponding atomic explanation is also available,
the ‘compound’ explanation is surely in order as it stands.11
In general, a compound explanation can be regarded as having a treelike
structure. For example, wemay plausibly give the following explanation of the fact
that a certain figure S is a square. First we explain why S is a square by saying that
it is equilateral and it is a rectangle. We then explain why it is equilateral by saying
that its sides are of equal length, and we explain why it is a rectangle by saying
that it has four sides that meet at right angles. In this example the first atomic
explanation, at the root of the tree, branches into two further atomic explanations
corresponding to the two facts that constitute its explanans.
This is an example of a compound explanation in which the explanans of one
atomic explanation is given a further explanation—in which the explanans of
one atomic explanation does double duty as the explanandum of another such
explanation. But explanatory connections toomay be further explained.Wemight
extend our explanation of S’s being a square, for instance, by concatenating it with
an atomic explanation whose explanandum is the connection between S’s having
equal sides and its being equilateral.
In general, then, we may represent an explanation by means of a tree, Figure .,
with the target of the explanation at the root of the tree.The target’s children will
be the explanans and explanatory connection of the target’s atomic explanation.
Both explanans and connection, as we have seen, may be further explained;
that is, they may be the explananda of further atomic explanations. If either is
further explained, then it will have children: the explanans and connection of
this further atomic explanation.These last facts may in turn be explananda of yet
further atomic explanations, and so on.
Such explanatory trees will be quite useful to us. But there is one structural
feature of explanations that is so far not represented by them and that we must
not neglect. These trees as we have defined them ignore the distinction between
an explanans and an explanatory connection: both are simply children of their
11 I take this ‘chemical’ terminology from Strevens ().
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S is a square
S is a rectangle
S has 4 sides
at right angles
C2
S is equilateral
S has sides
of equal length
C3
C1
Figure . Explanation of the fact that S is a square.
explanandum.Wemaymark this distinction graphically by enclosing explanantia
with starbursts (to depict the explanatory ‘oomph’ they provide) and connections
with circles. We will always draw the explanatory connection as the rightmost
child. Our explanation of S’s being a square, then, may be represented as in
Figure ..
. TheThesis of Completeness
I turn now to the proper statement of the thesis of completeness. How should we
understand the claim that fundamental reality is complete?
We might take it to require that every derivative fact have a metaphysical
explanation in which every fact save the target is fundamental. But this would
be too strong. One might think, for instance, that in order to explain in terms of
fundamental facts why Philadelphia is the most populous city in Pennsylvania,
we must appeal to derivative facts in the following way. First, we explain this
derivative fact about Philadelphia’s population by appeal to further derivative facts
about human beings. Second, we explain these facts about human beings by appeal
solely to fundamental facts. Despite the appeal to the derivative, this explanatory
situation is compatible with the thesis of completeness. Forwe are still able to show
how fundamental reality accounts for Philadelphia’s population.
Onemight wonder how we could possibly be forced to appeal to derivative facts
to explain Philadelphia’s population. Consider the fundamental facts appealed to
in the above explanation. Couldn’t we simply give an explanation of this fact about
Philadelphia by appeal to these fundamental facts alone? Not necessarily. For one
might think that none of them could serve as an explanatory connection between
other fundamental facts and the fact about Philadelphia. Indeed, one might think
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that no fundamental fact could serve as such a connection. Philadelphia is, so to
speak, too far above the fundamental.
We must, then, understand the thesis of completeness in a different way. We
might take it to require that every derivative fact have a metaphysical explanation
inwhich noderivative fact is leftunexplained; that is, one inwhich every derivative
fact has children. But this would be too weak. The requirement is satisfied, for
instance, by an explanation in which every fact is derivative but explained in
terms of other derivative facts, which are themselves explained in terms of further
derivative facts, and so on without end. Here although every derivative fact in the
explanation is explained, it is explained only in terms of other derivative facts.
Since the explanation never appeals to any fundamental fact, it does nothing to
show how its target is accounted for by fundamental reality. And so if there is
a derivative fact that can only be explained in this infinitary way, completeness
is false.
Instead, we should allow explanations of derivative facts to appeal to the
derivative, but require that these appeals be ‘discharged’: if we appeal to a derivative
fact, we must show how that fact is accounted for by fundamental reality. We
will assume that if, in discharging one appeal, we make a further appeal to the
derivative, then the first appeal is not discharged unless this further appeal is.
For otherwise we will not have shown how the first fact is accounted for by
fundamental reality.
We can state this requirement precisely in terms of our notion of an explanatory
tree.Wewill require that everymaximal path that begins at the target and proceeds
down the tree contain a fundamental fact.12 Let Strong Completeness be the
thesis that every derivative fact has an explanation that satisfies this discharging
requirement.That is:
Strong Completeness Every derivative fact has an explanation whose tree is
such that every maximal path that begins at the target and proceeds down the
tree contains a fundamental fact.
Call an explanation of the sort guaranteed by this thesis a strongly fundamental
explanation.
12 This formulation of the requirement is informed by Rosen’s () formulation of metaphysical
naturalism. One might think we should instead adopt the stronger formulation that every maximal
path beginning at the target must have a point beyond which every fact is fundamental. (This
formulation is more analogous to Rosen’s.) But it is very plausible that no fundamental fact can be
explained by appeal to any derivative fact (if indeed fundamental facts can be explained at all). Given
this assumption the two formulations are equivalent.
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However, one might think that Strong Completeness is too strong. It requires
us not only to discharge appeals to derivative facts as explanantia, but also to
discharge appeals to derivative facts as explanatory connections. And although
the former requirement is plausible enough, one might question the latter. After
all, explanantia and connections differ in their explanatory roles. One might
even think that connections are somehow peripheral to explanation: they lack
the ‘oomph’ that explanantia provide. Let us therefore consider weakening Strong
Completeness so that we require only that appeals to derivative facts as explanantia
be discharged. On this proposal, we obtain the thesis:
Weak Completeness Every derivative fact has an explanation whose tree is
such that every maximal path containing only explanantia that begins at the
target and proceeds down the tree contains a fundamental fact.
Call an explanation of the sort guaranteed by this thesis a weakly fundamental
explanation.
One might think to reject Weak Completeness on the grounds that it simply
ignores the need to account for derivative facts appealed to as explanatory con-
nections. Weak Completeness, it might seem, is compatible with there being a
derivative fact that can be explained only by appeals to derivative connections
which cannot themselves be discharged. But connections are indispensable to
explanation; one cannot explain anything without appeal to them. So if there
is such a derivative fact, then there is an important sense in which this fact
cannot be accounted for by fundamental reality. And so one might worry that
Weak Completeness is compatible with there being a derivative fact that cannot be
accounted for by fundamental reality.
But Weak Completeness should not be rejected on this basis. To be sure, Weak
Completeness is compatible with there being a derivative fact that is explained by
appeals to derivative connections that are not themselves discharged within that
very explanation. But it guarantees that those appeals will at least be discharged in
separate ‘standalone’ explanations. After all, derivative connections are derivative
facts. Since Weak Completeness guarantees a weakly fundamental explanation
for every derivative fact, it guarantees weakly fundamental explanations for
these connections. And thus these appeals to derivative connections will be
discharged.13
However, one still has the sense that Weak Completeness is wrong about the
‘sources’ of completeness, or of failures of completeness. Consider the following
explanatory scenario. A derivative fact A can be explained only by appeal to
13 Thanks to Cian Dorr, Kit Fine, and Daniel Waxman for discussion of this issue.
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C1
F1 C2
C2
F2 C1
Figure . A problem forWeak Completeness.
a derivative connection C. Although A may be given a weakly fundamental
explanation, C has no such explanation. Indeed, we might suppose there is simply
no way to show how fundamental reality accounts for C in any sense. C just ‘floats
free’ of the fundamental. One has the sense that completeness fails in this scenario,
not just because ofC, but because ofA too. SinceA can be explained only by appeal
to C, and there is no way to account for C, there is no way to account for A. Strong
Completeness respects this sense: A and C will both lack strongly fundamental
explanations. But as far asWeak Completeness goes, there is no trouble at all with
A. It satisfies the only requirementWeak Completeness imposes.
This shortcoming of Weak Completeness can be parlayed into a serious objec-
tion. Suppose there are two derivative facts C and C that figure in each other’s
explanations as depicted in Figure .. The sole atomic explanation of C has
fundamental explanans F and connection C, and the sole atomic explanation
of C has fundamental explanans F and connection C. Of course, these will not
be the only explanations of C and C. We may obtain a compound explanation
of C, for instance, by concatenating the atomic explanation of C with the
atomic explanation of C. And we may extend this compound explanation by
concatenating it with the atomic explanation of C. And so on. But we may
suppose that the only compound explanations of C and C result from repeated
concatenations of these atomic explanations.
Clearly, this explanatory scenario is not compatible with the thesis of complete-
ness.There is no way to show how eitherC orC is accounted for by fundamental
reality: any attempt results in our going around in a circle. But the scenario is
perfectly compatible with Weak Completeness.The only explanantia, after all, are
fundamental, and so any explanation of C or C will be weakly fundamental.
Weak Completenessmisjudges this scenario because it does not allow an appeal
to a derivative explanatory connection to be the ‘source’ of a failure of complete-
ness. In many cases this shortcoming is concealed, since the troublesome connec-
tion will itself lack a weakly fundamental explanation and so Weak Completeness
will fail anyway. But the present scenario lays the shortcoming bare: an appeal to
C or C is a ‘source’ of completeness failure, yet both have weakly fundamental
explanations.
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Strong Completeness, by contrast, prohibits this scenario. Given any explanation
of C there will be a maximal path running down the ‘right-hand side’ of the
explanatory tree that includes only repeated instances of the derivative facts C
and C. And similarly for C. The scenario is thus incompatible with Strong
Completeness.
To be sure, the scenario exhibits a kind of explanatory circularity. And although
some philosophers have wished to leave open the possibility of circular expla-
nation,14 many have taken it to be impossible. But this is beside the point. If
one thinks the fundamental is complete, then one need not even take a stand
on whether the scenario exhibits an impossible kind of circularity in order to
conclude that it does not obtain. For we have a clear judgment that one can on
grounds of completeness alone reject the scenario. Strong Completeness accords
with this judgment;Weak Completeness does not.
We should not be tempted to add an anticircularity condition to Weak Com-
pleteness in order to rule out the scenario. For completeness is compatible with
circularity. The thesis of completeness could be satisfied, for instance, if C and
C had other atomic explanations in addition to those depicted in Figure .. I
conclude that Weak Completeness is irredeemably flawed as a statement of the
thesis of completeness.
Strong Completeness, then, is the right way to understand the thesis. Insofar as
we have reason to believe that the fundamental is complete, we have reason to
believe Strong Completeness.
. An Objection to Strong Completeness
But Strong Completeness places serious explanatory demands on us, and onemight
well worry that these demands cannot be met. The force of this worry is best
brought out by means of the following objection. I will argue that it is only by
admitting fundamental laws of metaphysics that we are able to see how the worry
may be addressed.
The objection is this: there appears to be no way to give strongly fundamental
explanations—explanations of the sort guaranteed by Strong Completeness—of
a large class of derivative facts. The class is best characterized by means of a
new notion of derivativeness, one that applies to things rather than facts. Intu-
itively, a derivative thing is a thing (broadly understood) that is not among ‘the
basic furniture of the world’. There are countless such things: think of Stone-
henge, or of the Odyssey, or even of the property of being a city. The class of
14 Such as Nozick (, –) and Jenkins ().
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derivative facts I have in mind are simply those that involve derivative things.
Such facts surely are derivative. For if they were fundamental, then the things
they involve would figure in the fullest description of fundamental reality. And
this would seem sufficient to render these things part of the basic furniture of
the world.
But what is it for a fact to involve a given thing a? Our conception of facts as
structured entities gives us two ways this may occur. First, the fact may contain
a as a constituent; the fact that Obama is president involves Obama in this way.
Second, the fact may contain a complex whose value is a; the fact that  +  is
prime involves  in this way.
Take a fact that involves, in either of these ways, a derivative thing—say, that
Stonehenge is in England. How can we give a strongly fundamental explanation
of it?Wemight try first to offer an atomic explanation. To fix ideas, let its explanans
be the fact that there are particles ‘arranged ϕly’. Although (we may suppose) this
explanans is fundamental, it might be thought that the same cannot be true of the
explanatory connection.The connection will apparently be something like:
That there are particles arranged ϕly makes it the case that Stonehenge is in
England.15
This fact will not be fundamental, since it involves Stonehenge.16 So our atomic
explanation is not strongly fundamental.17
Of course, we can offer more complex explanations, but these will face the same
difficulty. Consider an arbitrary explanation E of the fact that Stonehenge is in
England. Call this fact A. It appears we will always be able to construct a maximal
path down the ‘right-hand side’ of E’s explanatory tree that never reaches the
fundamental, thus showing that E is not a strongly fundamental explanation. Let
15 Perhaps ‘makes it the case’ should be replaced by something like ‘determines’ or even ‘grounds’.
But I will use ‘makes it the case’ as a generic placeholder.
16 Sider (, –)makes a similar point. Such connections, it should be acknowledged, give rise
to a significant puzzle. For if the connections are derivative, then theymust themselves be explained by
fundamental facts, and it is not at all clear what these factsmight be. (The puzzle has been discussed by
Bennett (), deRosset (), andDasgupta ().) But the objection I develop here is independent
of this puzzle: it would remain even if we could find fundamental facts that could plausibly be taken
to explain these connections.
17 We might attempt to avoid this conclusion by taking the connection to involve only facts.
That is, we might take it to be of the form fRg, where f is the fact that there are particles arranged
ϕly, g is the fact that Stonehenge is in England, and R is some ‘making it the case’ relation. If the
connection is of this form, it will not itself involve Stonehenge. But this move is ultimately to no
avail, for the connection will still involve the derivative fact g. And surely any derivative fact is itself
a derivative thing. The fact that Stonehenge is in England is no more a part of the world’s basic
furniture than Stonehenge itself. Since the proposed connection involves a derivative thing, it is not
itself fundamental. Similar remarks apply below.
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the first fact in the path be A, the (derivative) fact that Stonehenge is in England.
E will contain an atomic explanation of A with explanans B and explanatory
connection C. Let the second fact in the path be C. As before, this connection
will apparently be something like:
B makes it the case that Stonehenge is in England.
And if that is so, then C is not fundamental since it involves Stonehenge. So if
E does not contain a further explanation of C, we have the desired path. If on
the other hand E does contain such an explanation, then it will contain an atomic
explanation of C with explanans B and explanatory connection C. Let the third
fact in the path be C. C will apparently be something like:
B makes it the case that B makes it the case that Stonehenge is in England.
And soC also involves Stonehenge and thus will not be fundamental. So if E does
not contain a further explanation of C then we again have the desired path, while
if E does contain such an explanation we can continue as before. So either the
desired path is some path of the form A,C,C, . . . ,Cn, or it is the infinite path
A,C,C, . . . .18 Either way, E is not a strongly fundamental explanation.
In the face of this objection, one might think we should abandon Strong
Completeness. For whatever the attractions of the view, if it cannot accommodate
facts involving derivative things it must be given up. But in fact this drastic step is
not necessary.
The objection depends on the following assumption: in an atomic explanation
whose explanandum is A and whose explanans is B, the explanatory connection
will be something like:
Bmakes it the case that A.
If the connection is of this form, then it will involve the things that are involved
in A and B. So if A involves Stonehenge, for instance, the connection will too.The
connection will thus be barred from the fundamental.
But once this assumption is examined it is clear that it should be rejected.
Consider again our crimson barn. To be sure, we might take its crimsonness to
explain its redness by means of a connection of the above form, perhaps:
That the barn is crimson makes it the case that it is red.
18 It is perhaps possible that there is an even longer infinite path through E of which this last path
is a proper subpath. But we should not rest our defense of Strong Completeness on dubious claims
about what facts might lie ‘after’ these infinitely many facts.
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But in addition to this barn-involving connection, there seems to be a more
general connection between an arbitrary thing’s being crimson and its being red.
And so wemight instead give an explanation by appeal to this general connection.
This second explanationwould seem to be a perfectly good one, certainly noworse
than the first. And although we will examine such general connections in detail
below, it is clear even now that this connection will not be something like:
That the barn is crimson makes it the case that it is red.
For surely the general connection does not involve this particular barn.
If this notion of a general metaphysical-explanatory connection can be made
out, we might be able to meet the demands of Strong Completeness after all. In
particular, we might be able to use such connections to give strongly fundamental
explanations of facts involving derivative things. In the next section I sketch an
account of these general connections, which I call laws of metaphysics. I then
apply this account in a few simple cases to give strongly fundamental explanations
of facts involving derivative objects and properties. I suggest that in light of the
account’s success, we are able to see how Strong Completeness can be true after all.
It is worth noting that the notion of a law of metaphysics has interest apart
from the issue of completeness. Just as many causal explanations appeal to general
causal-explanatory connections—laws of toxicology, perhaps—so it is plausible
that many metaphysical explanations will appeal to such general explanatory
connections. Examples are not hard to come by; the connection between crimson
and red provides an especially clear case. And so even those who reject Strong
Completeness—indeed, even those who reject any completeness requirement—
may find something of value in the account below.
. Laws of Metaphysics
Let Crimson be the general connection mentioned in §. between an arbitrary
thing’s being crimson and its being red. It seems we may give the following
perfectly good atomic explanation of the fact that the barn is red:
Explanans: The barn is crimson.
Connection: Crimson.
Explanandum: The barn is red.
But what is the logical form of the fact Crimson?
A natural thought is that this fact is just a universal generalization, some-
thing like:
For all x, if x is crimson, then that x is crimson makes it the case that x is red.
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It may be that Crimson is materially equivalent to some such universal general-
ization. But even if this is so, there is reason to think the two are distinct facts.
Consider some other crimson object, perhaps a crimson planet in a distant galaxy.
Since universal generalizations are explained, at least in part, by their instances, if
Crimson is a universal generalization it will be partly explained by facts about this
planet. So if we were to explain the redness of the barn and then explain in turn
all the facts in our explanation, we would have to appeal to facts about this planet.
But it is very plausible that such facts play no role whatsoever in explaining the
redness of our barn. They are just irrelevant! At the very least we do not want
our understanding of Crimson to commit us to taking the barn’s redness to be
explanatorily dependent on some extragalactic planet.19
What if we hold a unificationist view, onwhich explaining something is amatter
of fitting it into a larger pattern?20 Isn’t the redness of the barn then explanatorily
dependent on the distant planet, since the planet is part of the larger pattern? No.
Unificationism is a view about what makes something count as an explanation,
not about the content of explanations. The unificationist will say that part of
what makes our explanation count as an explanation is that it is an instance of
a larger pattern of similar explanations, one of which concerns this planet. This
distant planet, then, does play a role in what makes our explanation count as
an explanation. But the unificationist is under no pressure to take the planet to
appear in the explanation itself nor in the explanation of any of the facts in this
explanation.
The argument that Crimson is not a universal generalization depends on
the claim that universal generalizations are partly explained by their instances.
It might be proposed that some universal generalizations—those that are
‘nonaccidental’—can be explained in terms of the essences of things, or in terms
of some sort of laws.21 But this proposal is quite compatible with our explanatory
claim. For example, one might think that nonaccidental universal generalizations
are jointly explained by their instances together with essences or laws. Or one
might think that such generalizations admit of two independent explanations,
one given partly in terms of their instances and one given in terms of essences or
laws. Or, what strikes me asmost likely, onemight think that these generalizations
are partly explained by their instances, which are themselves partly explained
by essences or laws. And still other options are available. So this proposal gives
19 Thanks to Zee Perry for discussion on this point.
20 Kitcher () develops an influential unificationist account of explanation.
21 Rosen (, –) considers these proposals.
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us no reason to deny that universal generalizations are partly explained by their
instances.
I must of course reject the strong proposal that nonaccidental universal gen-
eralizations are explained by essences or laws to the exclusion of their instances.
But this proposal is implausible. For one thing, it is natural to think of universal
quantification as a generalized version of conjunction. To say that everything
is F is to say that a is F and b is F and so on, for each thing there is. Since
conjunctive facts are explained by their conjuncts, it is plausible that universal
generalizations are at least partly explained by their instances. For another, we
have a clear intuitive judgment that the instances are explanatorily relevant to the
generalization. Consider the claim that all quantities of HO are also quantities
of water. It is not irrelevant to the explanation of this that this particular gallon of
HO is also a gallon of water. So why adopt the strong proposal, especially given
that more plausible options are available?
I see no good reason, and so I will assume that Crimson is not a universal
generalization. But those who think it is a generalizationmay still accept the larger
argument of this chapter, provided they are willing to admit some generalizations
as fundamental facts.
If Crimson is not a universal generalization, then what is its logical form? It
clearly has a sort of generality, but it is a general fact that is not explained by its
instances. Since this sort of generality is not achieved through quantification, it
must instead be achieved through another variable-binding operator.
I propose therefore that we recognize a new operator≪. We should allow the
operator to bind any number of variables, since our intuitive understanding of a
general metaphysical-explanatory connection does not support any relevant limit.
And because a fact may bemetaphysically explained by any number of other facts,
the operator should also be variably polyadic ‘on the left’.22 A statement of a general
connection will therefore be of the form
ϕ, . . . ,ϕn ≪α...αm ψ
where ϕ, . . . ,ϕn,ψ are sentences and α, . . . ,αm are variables.23
We may now state the fact Crimson as
Crimson x is crimson≪x x is red.
22 Cf. Fine’s () variably polyadic operator for making statements of ground.
23 Fine () discusses generic statements of metaphysical explanation in the context of identity
criteria and employs a similar notation. Also related are Dorr’s (MS) discussion of statements of the
form ‘to be F is to be G’ and Rayo’s () discussion of ‘just is’ statements.
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Crimson states the general metaphysical-explanatory connection that holds
between an arbitrary thing’s being crimson and its being red. We may put this
in another way by speaking of facts: Crimson states the general connection that
holds between facts of the form ‘x is crimson’ and facts of the form ‘x is red’.
Once we have the notion of this general connection in view, we can plausibly
see particular connections as a special case. In just the way that, in general,
something’s being crimson makes it the case that it is red, so in particular does
the barn’s being crimson make it the case that the barn is red. We may formally
achieve this theoretical unification by allowing the ≪ operator to bind not just
any positive number of variables, but zero variables as well:
The barn is crimson≪ the barn is red.
Where the ≪ operator binds one or more variables, we will call the resulting
statement a law of metaphysics.
There seem to be constraints on which laws (or indeed which metaphysical-
explanatory connections) can figure in which explanations. For example, we can-
not appeal to Crimson in giving an atomic explanation of the fact that Stonehenge
is in England. But we can appeal to it in giving such an explanation of the redness
of any crimson thing. It seems likely that these constraints may be given a partly
formal characterization. As a partial and speculative step in this direction, let me
propose the following two principles of fit.
. If A has an atomic explanation with explanans B, . . . ,Bn and connection
ϕ, . . . ,ϕn ≪α...αm ψ , then B, . . . ,Bn,A are obtainable from ϕ, . . . ,ϕn,ψ
respectively by substitution on α, . . . ,αm.
. If B, . . . ,Bn,A and ϕ, . . . ,ϕn ≪α...αm ψ are facts, and if B, . . . ,Bn,A
are obtainable from ϕ, . . . ,ϕn,ψ respectively by substitution on α, . . . ,αm,
then A has an atomic explanation with explanans B, . . . ,Bn and connection
ϕ, . . . ,ϕn ≪α...αm ψ .
The first principle says that the form of a metaphysical-explanatory connection
must fit the form of the explanans and explanandum it connects. The second
principle says that if a connection obtains, then whenever some facts fit its form,
the connection will figure in an atomic explanation with these facts as explanans
and explanandum.
. Explaining the Derivative
With the account of §. we are now in a position to substantiate our tentative
response to §.’s objection to Strong Completeness. We will show in a few simple
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cases how laws of metaphysics might make possible strongly fundamental expla-
nations of facts involving derivative things. This section develops the details of
these explanations; §. defends the claim that they are strongly fundamental.
For the sake of concreteness, let us suppose the following metaphysical picture.
Electrons and regions of space are among the basic furniture of the world, and
facts about the locations of electrons are fundamental. Mereological fusions of
electrons, by contrast, are not among this basic furniture, and facts about the
locations of these fusions are not fundamental. If a and b are two electrons located
at points A and B, then the fact that the fusion of a and b is located at A ∪ B
involves a derivative thing: the fusion of a and b. Given our metaphysical picture,
it is plausible that this fact is explained by facts about the locations of a and b. But
how will we sharpen this thought into a strongly fundamental explanation?
In order to develop such an explanation, we must first specify its explanandum
more precisely. After all, the sentence
The fusion of a and b is located at A ∪ B
admits of more than one reading. On a ‘Russellian’ reading, the sentence has the
logical form
∃x (x fuses a and b ∧ ∀z(z fuses a and b→ z = x) ∧ x@A ∪ B).
It is not clear which fundamental facts explain the Russellian fact. Certainly it
is not explained just by the locations of a and b. For surely the locations of two
electrons do not explainwhy there is something that fuses them.And so how could
they explain the Russellian fact?24
In order for the example to have some plausibility, then, we will give the
explanandum sentence a ‘functional’ reading. We will take it to have the logical
form
Fu(a, b)@A ∪ B
where Fu is the function that maps any two objects to their mereological fusion.25
It is not just a and b whose locations explain the location of their fusion.There
seems to be a general explanatory connection—a law of metaphysics—linking the
24 Which fundamental facts do explain the Russellian fact? This is a difficult question and one
I do not know how to answer. But this is not only a difficulty for Strong Completeness but for any
completeness thesis whatsoever. I will therefore set the question aside.
25 One might think that this stipulation still fails to render the example plausible, on the grounds
that the functional fact is explained by the Russellian fact. If that is so, then since the locations of
a and b do not explain the latter, they cannot explain the former either. I see no reason to think
this explanatory situation holds, but those who are worried may give the explanandum sentence a
‘referential’ reading, on which it has the logical form ‘c@A ∪ B’. They may then give it a strongly
fundamental explanation as detailed in n. .
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
✐
OUP CORRECTED PROOF–FINAL, //, SPi
 martin glazier
location of any two things to that of their fusion. Harnessing the account of §.,
we may state this law as:
Fusion x@R, y@S≪xyRS Fu(x, y)@R ∪ S.
Wemay nowoffer the following explanation of the location of the fusion of a and b:
Explanans: () a is located at A; () b is located at B.
Connection: Fusion.
Explanandum: The fusion of a and b is located at A ∪ B.
This explanans is fundamental. And so if Fusion is fundamental as well, the
explanation is a strongly fundamental one.
We will defend the fundamentality of the fact Fusion in §., but first let us
consider a few more examples. Take a case involving, not a derivative object, but
a derivative property. Let it be the conjunctive property of being charged-and-
massive—that is, λx(Cx ∧ Mx). We will suppose that given an electron, the fact
that it is charged and the fact that it is massive are fundamental facts.
We can now give an explanation of the fact that this electron e is charged-and-
massive. It is plausible that this fact is explained by the fact that e is charged and
the fact that e is massive. And there is surely a general explanatory connection
between conjunctive properties and their conjuncts, which we may state as:
Conjunction Fx,Gx≪xFG (λy(Fy ∧ Gy))x.
Our explanation will then be as follows:
Explanans: () e is charged; () e is massive.
Connection: Conjunction.
Explanandum: e is charged-and-massive.
Since the explanans is fundamental, if the fact Conjunction is fundamental as well
then the explanation is strongly fundamental.
It will not have escaped notice that in both of these examples our explananda
involve derivative things in the same way: they contain a complex whose value
is a derivative thing. For example, the fact that the mereological fusion of a
and b is located at A ∪ B contains the complex Fu(a, b). But a fact may also
involve a derivative thing by having that thing as a constituent. For exam-
ple, let c be the fusion of a and b, and consider the fact that c is located at
A ∪ B. We will ultimately need to give strongly fundamental explanations of
facts like this too. Although there may be more than one way to do this, let
me propose one explanatory strategy that I take to be particularly simple and
attractive.
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Of course, some will not think there is a further explanatory task here. They
will not admit the distinction between two ways of involving, presumably because
they do not see facts as structured entities. They will see no distinction between
the fact that Fu(a, b) is located at A ∪ B and the fact that c is located at A ∪ B.
From this perspective, to give a strongly fundamental explanation of the former
is to give a strongly fundamental explanation of the latter. But I am not so easily
appeased. In my view these facts are distinct—one has c as a constituent, while the
other has only the fusion function—and demand distinct explanations.
What then explains why c is located at A ∪ B? I suggest that this question can
be answered by properly appreciating what c is. Let us work up to this by first
considering a more everyday mereological fusion: this quart of milk. It stands in
an intimate relationship to the two pints of milk that compose it. For one thing,
the quart is identical to the fusion of the pints. But the relationship goes beyond
that, for it also seems that what it is to be the quart is just to be the fusion of the
pints.26 In light of this ‘definitional’ connection, it is not implausible to think that
the fact that the quart is located at a certain region is explained by the fact that the
fusion of the pints is located at that region.
Although c is far removed from everyday life, it is plausible that as a fellow
mereological fusion it too bears a definitional connection to its parts: what it is
to be c is just to be the fusion of a and b. And so it is not implausible to think that
the fact that c is located at A∪ B is explained by the fact that the fusion of a and b
is so located.
We may therefore propose that there is a general explanatory connection here,
one that holds both between the quart and the fusion of the pints and between c
and the fusion of a and b.The connection is, we want to say, something like this:
That the fusion of two things is located at a region makes it the case that z is
located at that region, where z is the fusion.
Wemay propose that by appeal to some law along these lines—call it Fusion*—we
can give an explanation of c’s location as follows:
Explanans: The fusion of a and b is located at A ∪ B.
Connection: Fusion*.
Explanandum: c is located at A ∪ B.
But what precisely is the law? We might take it to be
Fu(x, y)@R ∪ S≪xyRS Fu(x, y)@R ∪ S.
26 I take this example from Fine ().
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But if we take this to be the law, wemust abandon our first principle of fit. After all,
our explanandum c@A ∪ B is not obtainable from Fu(x, y)@R ∪ S by appropriate
substitution. To be sure, the principles of fit are not beyond question. But it seems
likely that there are some formal constraints on which laws can figure in which
explanations. What would these constraints be, if these principles are not among
them?
Let us therefore seek a law whose ‘right-hand side’ is of the appropriate form.
We wish to state a general explanatory connection between a fact of the form
‘Fu(x, y)@R ∪ S’ and a fact of the form ‘z@R ∪ S’, where z = Fu(x, y). We might
take the law to be:
Fu(x, y)@R ∪ S≪xyzRS z@R ∪ S.
But this does not capture the relationship between z on the one hand and x
and y on the other, since here z varies independently of x and y. Indeed, by
the second principle of fit we would be forced to say that the fusion’s loca-
tion explains, not just c’s location, but the location of anything that occupies
A ∪ B.
One might think, of course, that c is the only such thing. But this response will
not in general be available. For we might wish to explain c’s mass in terms of the
mass of the fusion by appeal to a lawmuch like Fusion*.The law will be something
like this:
That the fusion of two things has a given mass makes it the case that z has that
mass, where z is the fusion.
If we state this law in the above manner as
Fu(x, y) has massm≪mxyz z has massm,
then the second principle of fit will entail that the mass of the fusion explains the
mass of anything else with that mass, which is obviously false.
We must instead state Fusion* in a way that captures the relationship between
x, y and z. To achieve this, we will jointly restrict the ranges of the variables bound
by the≪ operator: x, y and z (and R and S) will take only those values for which
z = Fu(x, y). We thus obtain
Fusion* Fu(x, y)@R ∪ S≪xyzRS : z=Fu(x,y) z@R ∪ S.
By appeal to this law, we may explain the fact that c is located at A ∪ B in terms
of the fact that the fusion of a and b is so located. But we have already explained
the latter above, and we have argued that this explanation is strongly fundamental
provided that Fusion is a fundamental fact. So if Fusion* is also a fundamental fact,
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wemay concatenate the present explanation with our earlier explanation to obtain
a strongly fundamental explanation of c’s location.27
Finally, let us note that our strategy for explaining c’s location seems applicable
also to facts that have derivative properties as constituents. Say that something
is ‘charsive’ if it is charged-and-massive—that is, if it has the conjunctive prop-
erty being charged-and-massive. We earlier distinguished the fact that Fu(a, b) is
located at A ∪ B from the fact that c is so located. Letting R be the property of
being charsive, we may in the same way distinguish the fact that a given electron
e is charged-and-massive ((λx(Cx∧Mx))e) from the fact that it is charsive (Re).28
The former has being charged and being massive as constituents, while the latter
has only being charsive.
How shall we explain the fact that e is charsive? We may proceed in much the
same way that we did in the case of c’s location. We will explain the fact that e is
charsive in terms of the fact that it is charged-and-massive by appeal to the law:
Conjunction* (λy(Fy ∧ Gy))x≪xFGH :H=λy(Fy∧Gy) Hx.
But we have already explained why e is charged-and-massive, and our explana-
tion is strongly fundamental provided Conjunction is a fundamental fact. So if
Conjunction* is fundamental as well, we may concatenate the present explanation
with our earlier explanation to obtain a strongly fundamental explanation of the
fact that e is charsive.
. Laws as Fundamental
We have now proposed explanations of four facts involving derivative things.
If the laws to which these explanations appeal are fundamental facts, then the
explanations will be strongly fundamental. And so we will be able to see how it
is possible that Strong Completeness is true.
But can these laws really be fundamental? To be sure, they do not bear the most
obvious mark of the derivative: they involve no derivative things. Stonehenge and
the like are nowhere to be found in them. But might there be more subtle reasons
to think them derivative?29
27 One might by appeal to a similar law give a strongly fundamental atomic explanation of the
fact that c is located at A ∪ B. Explanans: () a is located at A; () b is located at B. Connection:
x@R, y@S≪xyzRS : z=Fu(x,y) z@R ∪ S.
28 Rosen (, ) discusses a similar distinction.
29 If such laws are fundamental facts, do they bring with them fundamental ontological commit-
ments? Although I cannot settle the matter here, my own view is that they need not do so. Suppose
by analogy that one takes it to be a fundamental fact that God does not exist. In my view one need
not thereby countenance a certain ‘negative entity’, the lack of God, that sits alongside electrons and
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First of all, onemight take these general connections to be themselves explained
by still more general connections. Fusion, to take one example, states a general
connection between a pair of things and their mereological fusion. It might be
argued that Fusion is itself explained by a more general connection between an
arbitrary number of things and their fusion, and that it is only this more general
connection that is fundamental. But although this may well be true, to properly
formulate these more general connections would take us far afield. It wouldmore-
over leave intact our ultimate conclusion in favor of metaphysical-explanatory
connections that are both fundamental and general. I propose, therefore, that
we set such considerations aside.The objections considered below threaten these
more general connections as well as the simple laws of §., and our discussion
will proceed more clearly if we confine ourselves to simpler cases.
A second reason to doubt the fundamentality of §.’s laws is best put in terms of
a new notion of fundamentality, one that applies to the constituents of facts rather
than to the facts themselves. Just as we may distinguish fundamental and deriva-
tive facts, so we might distinguish fundamental fact-constituents and derivative
fact-constituents. A fundamental constituent corresponds to a structural division
in fundamental reality. If a description of fundamental reality ‘carves reality at the
joints’, then the fundamental constituents are what correspond to the joints. For
example, if the property of being charged is a fundamental constituent, then there
is a fundamental distinction between being charged and not being charged. By
contrast, there is presumably no fundamental distinction between Barack Obama
and everything else, reflecting Obama’s status as a derivative constituent.30
Let us admit the notion of constituent-fundamentality, if only for the sake of
argument. It might be objected that our laws must be derivative facts on the
grounds that they involve derivative constituents. Fusion, for instance, involves
the fusion function, which maps objects to their mereological fusions. Given the
background metaphysical picture we assumed, we must surely take c—the result
of applying the fusion function to a and b—to be a derivative constituent. But then
mustn’t we take the fusion function itself to be derivative?
No. Although c is a derivative constituent, nothing forces us to say the same of
the fusion function. That function is fundamental. From the perspective of the
regions of space in the world’s fundamental ontology. Instead, one need hold only that in order to
fully describe fundamental reality onemust say that God does not exist. In just the sameway, onemay
admit fundamental lawswithout thereby countenancing ‘nomic entities’ in the fundamental ontology.
One need hold only that in order to fully describe fundamental reality one must make statements of
law. (On this issue see Sider (, ch. ).) I thank an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to
this matter.
30 Sider (), building on Lewis (), develops a notion similar to our notion of a fundamental
constituent.
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friend of constituent-fundamentality, our position is this: although there is no
fundamental distinction between c and everything else, there is a fundamental
distinction between fusing some objects and performing some other operation
on them, or no operation at all.
There may however appear to be an argument showing that the fusion function
must be derivative. For if the function were fundamental, the derivative fact
Fu(a, b)@A ∪ B
would contain (we may suppose) only fundamental constituents. And isn’t this
absurd?
This argument depends on the following principle:
If all of the constituents of a fact are fundamental, then the fact is
fundamental.
This principle may seem to have some plausibility. For if a fact is built up
from constituents that all correspond to reality’s joints, how could it fail to be
fundamental?
But the principle is suspect on methodological grounds, since it rules out a
view that seems coherent and even somewhat plausible.31 One might think that
no fact of the form ¬¬¬A is fundamental, on the grounds that such facts are
metaphysically explained by facts of the form¬A. At the same time, one might be
impressed by the difficulty of giving explanations of certain facts of the form¬A—
the fact that a given electron is not located at a given region, for example—and thus
be led to take these facts to be fundamental. Even though this view is not obviously
correct, it is not without its attractions. Our very theory of fundamentality should
not rule it out. But the view is incompatible with this principle. For if ¬A is a
fundamental fact, then surely its constituents are fundamental as well; otherwise
it could not ‘carve reality at the joints’. And since ¬¬¬A is built up from those
same constituents, the principle requires that ¬¬¬Amust also be a fundamental
fact, which is just what the view denies.
I therefore do not think these considerations of constituent-fundamentality give
us reason to doubt the fundamentality of our laws. But the laws might be thought
derivative all the same, on the grounds that they involve operators whose variables
range over derivative things. Take Fusion, for example. At least on the natural way
of understanding the general connection between location and fusion, its scope
is not in any way restricted.The locations of the parts explain the location of the
whole, whether those parts are electrons or elephants.
31 The following example is due to Fine (), who also gives a second example with the same
structure. See Sider () in reply.
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To be sure, we are not forced by our explanation in §. to take the≪ operator
in Fusion to range over derivative things. We might restrict its range to electrons
and to regions of space, for instance, and still give much the same strongly
fundamental explanation of the location of the mereological fusion of a and b.
But such a restriction would be pointless and, at any rate, is not available in all
cases. It is pointless because Fusion involves the fusion function, which maps
objects to their fusions, and so in stating Fusion we must make general reference
to electron-fusions anyway. And it is not available in all cases because we must
take the ≪ operator in Fusion* to range over some electron-fusions: the fusion
of a and b, for instance. Our strongly fundamental explanation of c’s location
requires this.
Our view, then, requires general reference to derivative things at the fundamen-
tal level. Is this objectionable?
First of all, the admission of §.’s laws as fundamental need not commit us
to the fundamentality of just any law that makes general reference to derivative
things. For example, we need not admit as fundamental the unsightly law
Fx≪xF (Fx ∧ Fx) ∨ ¬(Fx ∨ Fx).
It is perfectly open to us to take this law to be derivative as long as we offer
a strongly fundamental explanation of it. Admittedly, I have no general way of
judging whether a fact, be it a law or some other kind of fact, is fundamental, but
in this I am hardly alone.We have no choice but to adjudicate fundamentality case
by case.
But though nothing forces us to take all laws to be fundamental, one might
still object to the fundamentality of even the laws of §.. For if these laws are
fundamental, then in order to describe fundamental reality one must, in some
sense at least, talk about derivative things like battles, elephants, and novels. And
one might think the fundamental facts simply cannot make reference of any kind
to the derivative.
It is clear that some kinds of reference to the derivative are objectionable. We
should certainly reject any view on which the fundamental facts make singular
reference to a derivative thing like Stonehenge. And some kinds of general ref-
erence to the derivative are also objectionable. Suppose it is a fundamental fact,
for example, that absolutely everything, Stonehenge included, is self-identical.
As we saw in §., there is reason to take this universal generalization to be
metaphysically explained, at least in part, by a fact involving Stonehenge. Since
this latter fact is derivative, we must take a fundamental fact to be explained by a
derivative one. But that is surely impossible. This generalization, then, cannot be
fundamental after all.
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But laws of metaphysics are a different kind of general fact. We saw in §. that
they are not explained by facts about what they make general reference to. In stat-
ing Crimson, for instance, we must make general reference to the many crimson
things in the world. But Crimson is not explained, even in part, by facts about
these individual crimson things. So although our laws do make general reference
to derivative things, there is no danger that by accepting them as fundamental
we will render the fundamental explanatorily dependent on the derivative. In
my view, once this aspect of laws is appreciated the apparent objection to their
fundamentality dissolves.32
Although there is more to be said on this issue, I cannot discuss it fully here.
I will simply conclude by suggesting that, far from being a liability, the laws’
reference to the derivative turns out to be a great strength.
It stands in need of explanation why there are any derivative facts at all.
Why aren’t there just the fundamental facts? Why are there battles, elephants,
and novels, rather than just atoms and void? We often explain the notion of
fundamental reality in intuitive terms by saying that all God had to do in order
to create the world was fix the fundamental facts. It is in order to ask: if that’s all
God did, why are there any further facts?There ought to be an answer.33
If there are fundamental laws of metaphysics of the sort we have described, then
an answer can easily be given. For it is plausible that it will lie in the nature of any
explanatory connection that if the connection and a suitable explanans obtain,
then a suitable explanandumwill obtain. It is in the nature of the ‘lawof toxicology’,
for instance, that if the law obtains and someone drinks hemlock, then that person
will die. So too will it lie in the nature of Fusion that if Fusion obtains, and facts
about some objects’ locations obtain, then so will a fact about their mereological
fusion’s location. And this, it seems, can only be due to the way in which Fusion’s
≪ operator links objects and their fusions.
Since among the fundamental facts are Fusion, a’s location and b’s location,
the fundamental facts will by their nature require that the fusion of a and b
have a certain location—a fact which is not among the fundamental facts. The
fundamental facts will therefore by their nature require that a further fact obtain.
32 Dowe face a further objection to the fundamentality of a law whose≪ operator binds a variable
that ranges exclusively over derivative things? If one took all fusions to be derivative, Fusion* would
be such a law. Would this law then involve a derivative thing, viz., a certain class or set of fusions? I
do not think so. It certainly would not involve such a thing in our sense of ‘involve’. Nor does there
appear to be any other sense in which it would involve such a thing. For one might take the law to
obtain and yet refuse to countenance classes or sets in one’s ontology. And so it is hard to see how
there could be a sense in which the law would involve any such thing. I thank an anonymous referee
for drawing my attention to this matter.
33 I am indebted to Jonathan Schaffer here.
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But this further fact is required only as a result of Fusion’s general reference to
derivative things.
One might, of course, have hoped to maintain a certain austere vision of
fundamental reality as entirely ‘self-contained’. But it seems such austerity must be
given up if we are to explain why there are any derivative facts at all.There must
be something within the fundamental facts themselves that requires the existence
of further facts. And this is just what our laws of metaphysics provide.
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